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Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans--
Forgotten Man Bankruptcy
By HARRY H. HADEN*
The Chapter XIII petitions, familiarly spoken of as "wage
earner's plans," can best be understood when it is realized that
this part of our law came into being as a separate chapter in the
Bankruptcy Act with the rest of the Chandler Act in 1938. Chapter
XIII is part of the "Forgotten Man" program which Franklin
Delano Roosevelt promised the country in the presidential cam-
paign of 1932. In construing and administering this part of the
bankruptcy law, we should keep in mind that it is necessarily
flavored by an era which also produced the Social Security, Public
Utilities, Securities and Exchange, and Wagner Acts.'
I. THE LAW RESTATED
This article will not be an attempt to write a short textbook
pertaining to Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. A number of
excellent articles of this kind are readily available in the law
reviews.2 In addition to such articles summarizing the law involved
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. This article is
based upon a research project financed by the University Research Committee of
the University of Alabama. A portion of the materials utilized in the research
was provided by the Brookings Institute.
' The citations in this article are to the official bankruptcy statute. The
Chandler Act was given the official title, "Bankruptcy Act' by the Act of Decem-
ber 20, 1950. Prior to that date the formal title was the "Bankruptcy Act of 1898
as amended." See Bankruptcy Act ch. 1138 (1950).
2 See Allgood, Operations of the Wage Earner's Plan in the Northern District
of Alabama, 14 RUTGms L. REv. 578 (1960). This article is an excellent review
of the law in operation as seen by a referee (now a federal district judge) who
has handled thousands of Chapter XIII cases. See also Nadler, Rehabilitation
of the Insolvent Wage Earner Under the Bankruptcy Act: A Challenge to Min-
nesota, 42 MXNN. L. REv. 377 (1957). Apparently Nadler's challenge has gone
unheeded. The Bankruptcy Annual Report from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, and the population and per capita income sections of THE
WoR.D ALMANAC, 1966, show that in 1965, of the 2,567 employee bankruptcies
in Minnesota, only 549 employed Chapter XIII. In the same year in Alabama, of
the 9,522 employee bankruptcies, Chapter XIII was employed in 7,804. See
also Woodbridge, Wage Earners Plans in the Federal Courts, 26 Mm. L. tEv.
775 (1942).
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in Chapter XIII, the law reviews also contain a number of stu-
dent comments.3 There is also a leading treatise4 which extensively
treats wage earner's plans. Of the small texts available, the best
is Professor Nadler's The Law of Debtor Relief.3
Nevertheless, for purposes of continuity and clarity, the early
pages of this article will briefly summarize the law. Chapter XIII
follows the pattern of most statutes which attempt to create a new
idea in the law. The Chapter first states that its provisions shall
apply exclusively6 except that other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act may apply when they are not inconsistent or in conflict.7 This
needed clarification is then followed by definitions of "claims,"
"creditors," "debtor," "debts," "executory contracts," "petition,"
"plan," and "wage earner." The last term is defined to be an
individual whose principal income is derived from wages, salary,
or commissions. A "claim" is defined as including all claims of
whatever character against the debtor or his property, whether
provable under section 63 of the act and whether secured or un-
secured, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, but not
including claims secured by estates in property or chattels real. A
creditor is defined as any holder of any claim.8 The law then says
that a creditor is concerned with a plan only if his interest shall
be materially and adversely affected thereby.9
The act gives the court exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor, his
property wherever located, and his earnings and wages during the
consummation period of the plan. This subsection illustrates the
basic difference between a voluntary petition filed in straight
bankruptcy and a Chapter XIII petition, since in the latter in-
stance, the court was given jurisdiction over earnings and wages
only for a period of time following the filing of the petition. The
basic intent of the law is to permit a wage earner to pay existing
debts out of future earnings without being harrassed by creditors.
3 See, Comment, 34 FonDHAm L. REv. 528 (1966); Comment, 45 MARQ.
L. REv. 582 (1962); Comment, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 533 (1966); Note, The Wage
Earner Plan-A Superior Alternative to the Straight Bankruptcy, 9 UTAH L. REV.
130 (1965).
4 See, 10 CoLLIma, Bxa uprcy (14th ed. 1965); 9 REmINGTON, BANAu'Tcy
417-38 (Henderson ed. 1955).
G NADLER, THE LAw oF DEBTOR REEF (1954).
6 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1001 (1938.
7 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1938).8 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1006 (1938).
9 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1007 (1938).
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The underlying basis for the statute was Congress's belief that a
wage earner's only asset might be his earning power and that he
should be able to turn this asset over to his creditors for a period
of time, if he so desired.10 To carry out its intent, Congress pro-
vided that the court may enjoin, or stay until final decree, the com-
mencement or continuation of any suit except those to enforce
liens upon the property of the debtor. Where cause is shown, a
court may also enjoin, or stay until final decree, suits to enforce
such liens."
Proceedings under Chapter XIII may be commenced by filing
a section 622 original petition or by filing a section 621 petition in
a pending bankruptcy, either before or after adjudication. The
petition must state that the debtor is insolvent or unable to pay his
debts as they mature. It must state that the debtor desires to
effect a composition or an extension of time on his debts with pay-
ment to be made out of future earnings or wages. Most Chapter
XIII petitions are original petitions requesting an extension. 2
Along with the petition, the debtor must file a statement of
affairs which shows his executory contracts, his creditors and their
addresses, and a summary of his assets and liabilities. He must also
deposit fifteen dollars; ten dollars of this is distributed to the
treasurer of the United States for deposit in the referee's salary
and expense fund, and five dollars goes to the clerk.13 Later, at
the first meeting of creditors, the debtor must submit his plan and
deposit an additional fifteen dollars. This sum also eventually
reaches the referee's salary and expense fund.14
The referee will often suggest that a wage earner's plan be
filed with the bankruptcy petition and its related papers. Although
not mandatory, such early filing of the plan is frequently ad-
vantageous because it allows the referee to study the petition, to
decide whether to confirm or deny it, and to take the appropriate
action at the first creditors' meeting.' 5
10 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1011 (1938).
11 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1938).
12 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1938).
13 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1024 (1938).
'4 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1033 (1938).
'5Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1053 (1938). This section provides that
alternatives or modifications of a plan may be proposed in writing by a debtor
with leave of court at any time before confirmation. This implies that the plan
itself may be proposed at any time.
[Vol. 55,
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Frequently, referees who handle an appreciable number of
these plans require the filing of a simplified statement of affairs,
which better presents the true picture of a wage earner's affairs
than the official bankruptcy form. These statements usually state
the petitioner's marital status, the spouse's name, and the marital
state as regards separation, divorce, alimony, and dependents.
The question of alimony becomes extremely important when a
man is paling alimony to a former wife and is now married a
second time. Referees often find that the effort to support two
families is responsible for the wage earner's problems. Among
other factual data contained in the simplified statement is a history
of the debtor's employment, his social security number, and the
total amount of wages earned by the family unit. All these facts
are important, as they have a bearing on the amount which may
be allocated for the payment of debts. The special statement of
affairs forms usually request information as to the debtor's equity
in a home or the family car and all related financial details, such
as the amount of monthly payments. This information is needed
by the referee so he may decide, in advance, whether to confirm
the plan at the first creditors' meeting. One referee stated that
the first thing he tells the debtor is to get rid of his car since it is
impossible to support both the family and a car.10
As already mentioned, the court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the debtor, his property wherever located, and his earnings and
wages during the period of consummation of the plan. Further,
the court may enjoin any action that interferes with effectuation
of the plan.'7 One court has even refused to permit a secured
creditor to subject his security to the payment of the debt, if the
plan providing for payment of the debt in accordance with the con-
tract repossession of the property would interfere with the feasibi-
lity of the plan. In that instance, the property, an automobile, was
used by the debtor in his livelihood.' 8 The plan filed contained a
provision for payment in accordance with the contract, but not
for delinquent payments.
10A statement as to the equity in the family car and the size of the
payments is normally included. In regard to this, at least one referee requires
that a debtor sell his car before the plan will be confirmed. See Bundscher,
Administration of Wage Earner's Plans in the Bankruptcy Court, 18 REF. J. 55(1944). See Appendix H to this article for a sample Statement of Affairs.
17 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1938).
1s 36 REF. J. 21 (1962).
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However, a similar case held that a referee could not stay
the enforcement of the conditional sales contract unless the plan
provided for payment consistent with the contract terms. Dictum
in the case indicated that if this property, an automobile, were
actually needed by the debtor to earn his wages, the referee could
enjoin repossession, even though the account was delinquent at
the time the petition was filed, if the plan filed provided for pay-
ment.19 In 1960, a seventh circuit decision went even further.
It held that, since all property of the debtor is within the jurisdic-
tion of the court, the referee has a duty to protect the equity
owned by the debtor in property, subject to a lien, which calls for
time payments. This duty existed even though the plan did not
provide for payment to secured creditors who did not accept the
plan. If the plan actually is adequate to handle these payments,
then the holder of the conditional sales contract will not be al-
lowed to reclaim the property. In this case, the property, an
automobile, might have been necessary for the earner's continued
earning power. Another item involved was a television set.20 A
different question is presented when the security is real property,
since section 606 does not cover claims secured by estates in pro-
perty or chattels real.2' Obviously, this particular claim is not a
part of the plan. However, since section 614 gives the court
jurisdiction over all property of the debtor without qualification
and the power to enjoin or stay any proceeding to enforce any
lien on the property of the debtor upon notice and for cause
shown, there seems to be little doubt that the court can enjoin
the foreclosure of a lien on real property, unless it abuses its
discretion.
The fourth circuit has used this approach in upholding in-
junctions when they are necessary to preserve the debtor's estate
or to carry out the plan if the issuance of the injunction does not
impair the security of the lien. Of course, the owner of the
secured indebtedness is never required to accept less than the
total of the periodic payments specified in the contract.2-
After the petition is filed, the law requires the clerk im-
19 In re O'Dell, 198 F.2d 389 (D.C. Kan. 1961).
20 In re Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960).2 1 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1006 (1938).
22 Hallenbeck v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
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mediately to refer the case to a referee.23 After giving ten days
notice the referee calls a creditors' meeting at which he presides
in much the same maner as he does at the first meeting of
creditors in a straight bankruptcy. In this first meeting, the court
receives written acceptances of creditors on the proposed plan.
The law permits the debtor to obtain these acceptances either be-
fore or after filing of the petition. After the plan has been ac-
cepted, a trustee is appointed to receive and distribute the money
to be paid under the plan. The referee then sets a time for filing of
the application to confirm the arrangement and for a hearing on
the confirmation. However, the law clearly states that these times
can be set in the original notice; thus confirmation can take place
at the first meeting of the creditors. Confirmation can also be
accomplished even without notice if all creditors affected by the
arrangement have accepted it.24
In some jurisdictions, attorneys, aware that the referee would
like to dispense with the necessity of a second hearing, file a plan
with the petition and provide notice to the creditors that confirm-
ation will be considered at the first meeting. Since the referee has
a statement of affairs filed with the petition, he has a chance to
study the whole case in advance and is able to conduct the
creditors' meeting by accepting the claims, by asking for objections
to the plan, and finally by confirming it with any modification that
he wishes to make. In many instances where a plan calls for pay-
ments which the referee feels are more than the debtor can pay
consistent with care of his family, the plan will be modified. Under
other circumstances, larger payments may be required.25
Creditors' claims must be filed and proved to be allowed. In
the usual situation, they will be filed at the first meeting of
creditors, and a creditor will not be entitled to participate in the
plan, "as a matter of right," unless he has filed this claim within
23 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1031 (1938).24 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1033 (1938). The section states that these
times may be set by the letter of notice to the creditors. Thus confirmation may
be had at the first meeting if the creditors consent. Using this procedure, referees
in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama have been able to
dispose of as many as fifty cases in one morning.
25 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1053 (1938). Alterations or modifications
may be proposed at any time before the plan is confirmed. Referees are careful
to modify the amount to be paid to the trustee to a figure that the debtor can pay
and still adequately provide for his family.
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six months after the date of the first meeting.26 This follows be-
cause all-nonconflicting provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are in-
corporated into Chapter XIII27 and section 57 (n) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides that claims which have not been filed within
six months after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors
shall not be allowed. At one time, section 57 (n) excepted from
this six months provision proceedings under Chapter XIII, but
the exception was eliminated from the Act on July 7, 1952.28
This does not mean, however, that the referee, in his dis-
cretion, cannot amend the plan to include a late-filing creditor or
a subsequent creditor. In order to avoid the necessity of sending
notices to creditors and having a hearing,29 the referee could re-
quire that an additional amount be allocated to the trustee from
the debtor's wages to take care of this payment.30 This would not
affect the rights of the original creditors to the plan.3 '
For purposes of analysis, let us assume that there is a supple-
mental creditor whose right accrued after the plan was filed. As-
sume also that the debt arose from the purchase of necessities and
that the referee, having absolute control of the debtor's wages,
authorized the payment of this debt out of wages. The payment of
this debt might make it impossible for the debtor to support his
family and still pay into court the amount provided for the plan,
thereby resulting in a default. If this occurred, then the court
would be required to enter an order dismissing the wage earner's
26Bankruptey Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1938).27 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1938).
28 Pub. L. No. 456, 82nd Congress, 2d Session § 1 (1952).2 9 An alternative solution to the subsequent creditor problem would be to
notify the other creditors, hold a hearing, and reduce the amounts payable to the
other creditors. Authority for this action could be found in the section which
provides that the contents of a plan "shall" include provisions authorizing the
court to increase or reduce the amount of any of the installment payments provided
by the plan, to extend or shorten the time for any such payments where it shall
be made to appear, after hearing upon such notice as the court may designate,
that the circumstance of the debtor so warrant or require. Therefore, in order
to reduce the amount to be received by any creditor, the referee should show
that the reduction is necessary for the debtor to-carry out his plan.
30 Because the court has the discretionary power to enjoin, or stay until final
decree, the commencement of suits or attachments against any of the property
of the debtor, the referee could free some portion of the debtor's wages fom the
stay order and allow the subsequent creditor to recover through garnishment
proceedings. However, the simple way to handle this is merely to instruct the
trustee to pay this amount to the subsequent creditor.
31See In re Heger, 180 F. Supp. 147, 151 (D.C. Minn. 1959) for the
proposition that a creditor who has not proved his claim within a reasonable time
has no right to participate.
[Vol. 55,
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proceeding. If the proceeding had arisen out of a prior bank-
ruptcy, the referee would be required to adjudicate the debtor a
bankrupt. If the proceeding arose out of an original petition and
if the debtor consented, the referee could adjudicate him a bank-
rupt. In the absence of consent, the referee merely dismisses the
proceeding. Obviously, the continuation of the proceeding will
depend upon the satisfactory disposition of supplemental obliga-
tion based upon necessity.32
If the amount paid to the original creditors must be reduced
to satisfy the claims of subsequent creditors, the referee should
give notice of and the reason for the reduction. If a majority of
the prior creditors do not consent to the change, the plan should
be discontinued. On the other hand, if the wage earner has enough
equity in his wages to satisfy the new obligation, the referee may
order that any portion of these funds be distributed for any pur-
pose agreeable to the debtor so long as it does not interfere with
the plan.33
The problem of subsequent creditors, whether their obliga-
tion existed at the time of the petition or came into existence after
the filing of the petition, takes on a new light in view of the re-
cent Supreme Court case of Perry v. Commerce Loan Co.34
There, the Court held that a wage earner's petition under Chapter
XIII was not to be looked upon as a bankruptcy and thus was not
barred when filed within six years of a discharge. Under this
holding, a wage earner who finds that he must obligate himself in
an amount large enough to interfere with a confirmed plan could,
by the process outlined in the preceding paragraph, give the
referee the right to dismiss the existing plan. The wage earner
could immediately file a new plan scheduling the old and new
debts, and if a majority of the creditors consented, the referee
could confirm this new plan.
Since the plan and its confirmation are the hub of a wage
earner's petition, care should be taken to submit a plan to the
court which satisfies the statutory requirements. The chapter
states that a plan:
3 2 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1066 (1938).
3 3 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1007 (1938). The section states that a
creditor shall be affected by a plan only where his interest is "materially and
adversely" affected.
.4 383 U.S. 392 (1966)
1967]
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1. shall include provisions dealing with unsecured debts
generally, upon any terms;
2. may include provisions dealing with secured debts sev-
erally, upon any terms;
3. may provide for priority of payment during the period of
extension as between the secured and unsecured debts
affected by the plan;
4. shall include provisions for the submission of future earn-
ings or wages of the debtor to the supervision and control
of the court for the purpose of enforcing the plan;
5. shall provide that the court may from time to time during
the period of extension increase or reduce the amount of
any of the installment payments provided by the plan, or
extend or shorten the time for any such payments, where it
shall be made to appear, after hearing upon such notice as
the court may designate, that the circumstances of the
debtor so warrant or require;
6. may include provisions for the rejection of executory con-
tracts of the debtor;
7. may include any other appropriate provisions not incon-
sistent with this chapter.35
In connection with "the subsequent creditor problem" dis-
cussed above, it was stated that the authority for treating it rests
upon provision five, which is mandatory. In addition to provision
five, provisions four and one are also mandatory, while provisions
two, three, six, and seven are within the discretion of the debtor.
The first provision of the plan is obviously necessary since all
of the unsecured debts must be dealt with if the plan is to be
feasible. The wording here, though not express, clearly implies
that all unsecured debts must be dealt with. Even though the
second provision is optional with the creditor, it has been held
that a plan which did not provide for payments of a secured claim
still "dealt" with the secured creditor's claim since the plan would
"materially and adversely affect [the] creditor's interest."30 In
35 The jurisdiction and authority of the referee to issue an order instructing
the trustee to pay a late-filing reditor is supported by the statutory sections which
give the court exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor, his proper wherever located,
and his earnings and wages during the consummation peri of the plan. The
broad discretion given the referee is also exhibited in the power to extend any time
period which, under the Bankruptcy Act, the court could originally have set.36 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1007 (1938).
[Vol. 55,
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connection with the third provision, it has previously been stated
that a secured creditor within the plan is protected by the juris-
dictional sections and, even if a creditor refuses to accept the plan,
he is still subject to the jurisdiction of the court. If the court in
its discretion enjoins the enforcement of the security without
affecting the creditor's contractual rights, the creditor does not
have any complaint. However, this does not mean that the plan
should be confirmed over the creditor's objection if his rights are
not protected.37 The fourth provision of the plan is obviously
necessary and requires that future earnings or wages of the debtor
must be submitted to the supervision and control of the court for
the purpose of enforcing the plan. The fourth provision does
not say that it is adequate to submit only a portion of the wages;
rather it impliedly makes submission of all wages a mandatory
part of any plan. The sixth provision, which is optional, deals
with the rejection of the debtor's executory contracts. The seventh
section, also optional, is a catch-all section. Some referees may use
it to permit the inclusion of subsequent creditors if the obligations
were created for necessities.
A central problem in drafting a plan is to anticipate its con-
firmation. Under the Bankruptcy Act, confirmation is a two-step
process. First, when the plan has been accepted in writing by all
creditors "affected thereby," it is to be confirmed if the court is
satisfied that the plan and its acceptance have been made in good
faith and not procured by any means, promises, or acts forbidden
by the Bankruptcy Act. The key to this provision lies in the
statutory words "affected thereby." 38 This terminology is expanded
in an earlier section of the Bankruptcy Act which states that a
creditor shall be deemed affected by a plan only if his interest
shall be "materially and adversely affected thereby." 39 (Emphasis
added.) The question arises whether a secured creditor is so
"affected" by the plan that his consent is a prerequisite. This
question is partially dealt with by the General Orders in Bank-
ruptcy promulgated by the United States Supreme Court.40 They
provide that the reclamation sections applicable to straight bank-
371n re O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D.C. Kan. 1961).
38 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1051 (1938).39 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1007 (1938).
40Generap Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy, 805 U.S. 681f (1939).
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ruptcy are not applicable to Chapter XIII petitions.41 For this
reason, a secured creditor whose security interest failed to qualify
under the "materially and adversely affected" test would not be a
creditor whose acceptance was necessary in order to have an
acceptance by all creditors. 2
If a plan is not accepted by all creditors, then the second con-
firmation part of the Bankruptcy Act controls. This requires an
acceptance in writing by all of the secured creditors whose claims
are dealt with by the plan. It further requires an acceptance in
writing by a majority of all the unsecured creditors whose claims
have been proved and allowed, if this number represents a
majority in amount of such claims.43 The troublesome words here
are those which require that the plan be accepted by all of the
secured creditors whose claims are "dealt with by the plan." A
1961 district court case held that a secured creditor whose debt was
not scheduled for payment in the plan was "dealt with" and that
his acceptance must be obtained.44 True, a secured creditor who is
not provided for in the plan has lost the availability of a portion
of the debtor's earning power; since the secured creditor is within
the jurisdiction of the court, it certainly could be argued that his
claim has been "dealt with." On the other hand, it might be
argued that the term "dealt with" has the same meaning in the
law as the term "affected thereby" in the previous section, and if
the plan provides for payment of the obligation in conformance
with, or in a manner more advantageous than, the secured credi-
tor's contract, his interest has not been "materially and adversely"
affected by the plan. Therefore, in such situations it is not surpris-
ing to find that other courts generally do not require his ac-
ceptance as a prerequisite to confirmation by the referee.45 In a
1960 case, In re Clevenger,46 the seventh circuit held that a
secured creditor was not "dealt with" by the plan even though
the conditional sales contract was in arrears and the plan provided
41Ibid. See General Orders No. 28 and No. 55.
421n re Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re O'Dell, 198 F.
Supp. 389 (D.C. Kan. 1961).43 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1938).44 1n Re O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D.C. Kan. 1961). See also In re Pappas,
216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962).45 In re Wilder, 225 F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963); In re Clevenger, 282 F.2d
756 (7th Cir. 1960).
46 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960).
[Vol. 55,
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only for payment of future installments. The court found the
delinquency was not caused by filing the plan and that the rights
of the secured creditor had not been diminished. The implicit
rationale was that the particular plan required substantially the
same payments as those provided in the security device.
Since the Bankruptcy Act calls for acceptance by all secured
creditors and only a majority of unsecured creditors, the standing
of a creditor as secured or unsecured becomes extremely im-
portant. In many localities loan companies, while lending es-
sentially upon the general unsecured credit of the debtor, take a
blanket mortgage on his furniture in order to achieve the status of
a secured creditor. This tactic undoubtedly caused difficulties in
obtaining acceptance of all secured creditors until the 1956 de-
cision of the tenth circuit in City National Bank 8c Trust Co. v.
Oliver.47 There, a secured creditor with an unrecorded chattel
mortgage objected to the confirmation of the plan. The court
held that the invalidation provisions of section 70 (c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act applied in a Chapter XIII proceeding and that the
trustee could rely on them to negate the status of the secured
creditor and the requirement of his consent.48
It follows that an attorney drafting a plan for a debtor should
be careful that the rights of secured creditors are not "materially
and adversely affected thereby." By avoiding this bottleneck, only
a majority of the unsecured creditors will be required before the
referee can confirm the plan. Obviously, satisfaction of this re-
quirement should be relatively easy since they will fare far better
under a wage earner plan than under straight bankruptcy.
If there has been acceptance in writing by all creditors affected
by the plan, section 651 of the Bankruptcy Act would seem to
make confirmation mandatory, but there are further requisites in
the Act that might be construed to limit this mandatory effect.
These state in section 656 that the court shall confirm a plan if
satisfied that: (1) the provisions of this chapter have been com-
plied with; (2) it is feasible and for the best interest of the
creditors; (3) the debtor has not been guilty of any act or omis-
sions to act which would bar discharge in bankruptcy; and (4) the
47 230 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1956).4 8 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1938). This is the so-called 'strong arm
clause' which gives the trustee in bankruptcy standing as a lien creditor.
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proposal and its acceptance were made in good faith and were not
secured by any means, promises, or acts forbidden by the law.49
There is some disagreement as to whether section 656 requis-
ites are to be applied only to the confirmation of plans accepted
by a majority of the unsecured creditors under section 652, or
whether section 656 requisites must also be applied to plans
accepted by all the creditors under section 651. Collier takes the
former position and Nadler the latter.50 One thing becomes dear.
If there is an acceptance under either section 651 or 652 and the
requisites for confirmation set out in section 656 are met, then the
court must confirm the plan.51
According to the better view, a referee confronted with an ap-
plication to dismiss on the grounds that one of the requisites has
not been met should dismiss the action, even though the plan has
been unanimously accepted. It seems obvious that Congress meant
to include all requirements of the Chapter in listing the first
requisite. The second requisite certainly applies to a plan accepted
by either unanimous or majority vote since the referee must decide
feasibility, taking into consideration the debtor's financial ability
to carry out the proposals in the plan. As previously discussed,
where the debtor has agreed to pay more than is feasible, the
practice of most referees is to suggest that the proposed plan be
altered before confirmation. Since the fourth requisite is a pro-
hibitive one, it rightfully applies to an acceptance by either route.
The rationale is that where a debtor or creditor is guilty of
practices forbidden by the Act the court should not be forced to
take a plan merely because all creditors have accepted it.
The final requisite, that each creditor must file proof that his
claim is free from usury, would be of little value if a unanimous
vote of the creditors could deny the referee authority to question
the usurious nature of a claim. The history of the usury clause
indicates that congressional intent was to have this requirement
apply to every claim, regardless of whether the plan was unani-
49 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1056 (1938).50 Collier takes the position that § 656 applies only to plans accepted by
a majority of the creditors. See 10 Couaan, BANK UpTcy § 29.06 (14th ed.
1965); but see also NADLER, TnE LAw OF DEBTOR'S BRsa § 547 (1954), in
which the author argues that even if all creditors have accepted the plan in
compliance with § 651, the requisites for confirmation set out in § 656 must
be complied with.51 NADLER, Tnm LAw OF DEBTOR's RELIEF § 547 (1954).
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mously accepted. The original House bill did not contain this re-
quirement, but was amended by the Senate to include it. The
reason for the amendment is found in the testimony before the
Senate Committee by Judge Vallentine J. Nesbit, Special Referee
in Bankruptcy, Birmingham, Alabama. Referee Nesbit testified
that the experiments under former sections 12 and 74 established
that the distressed circumstances of wage earners were a result of
usurious claims and that the bill which passed the House could
not adequately protect the debtor unless the amending clause was
added.52
For purpose of convenience, the preceding discussion of the
requisites of confirmation has omitted the third requisite, since it
requires an examination of case law. The third requisite is that
the debtor has not been guilty of any act or omission to act which
would bar discharge in bankruptcy. This provision automatically
brings section 14 (c) into the confirmation requisites.53
An examination of the various grounds for denial of discharge
under section 14 (c) shows that most of the provisions would
seldom affect a wage earner. The first ground is that the bankrupt
52 83 CONG. REc. 8705 (1938) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney).
53 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1938) reads as follows:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has (1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided
under section 152 of Title 18; or (2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified,
concealed, or failed to keep or preserve books of account or records
from which his financial condition and business transactions might be
ascertained, unless the court deems such acts or failure to have beenjustified under all the circumstances of the case; or (3) obtained money
or property on credit, or obtained an extension or renewal of credit, by
making or publishing or causing to be made or published in any man-
ner whatsoever, a materially false statement in writing respecting his
financial statements; or (4) at any time subsequent to the first day of the
twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be
removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his property, with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors; or (5) in a proceeding under this
title commenced within six years prior to the date of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy had been granted a discharge, or had a composi-
tion or a wage earner's plan by way of composition confirmed under this
title; or (6) in the course of a proceeding under this title refused to obey
any lawful order of, or to answer any material question approved by the
court; or (7) has failed to explan satisfactorily any losses of assets or
deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities: Provided, that if, upon the
learning of an objection to a discharge, the objector shall show to thesatisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which, under this sub-
division, would prevent his discharge in bankruptcy then the burden ofproving that he had ot committed any of such acts sbhall not be upon
the bankrupt.
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has committed a criminal offense punishable under Title 18, U.S.
Code, Section 152. It is unlikely that a wage earner would violate
this criminal law. Neither the second nor the third ground
normally apply in a wage earner's petition. The second ground
is that he has destroyed or failed to keep accounts of records from
which his financial condition might be ascertained, unless the
court deems such failure to have been justified under the circum-
stances. The third involves the making of a false financial state-
ment while engaging in business, and usually the wage earner
does not engage in business. Nor would the fourth ground apply
to wage earner petitions since it is the removal or concealment of
property with intent to defraud his creditors. The sixth and
seventh grounds for denial of discharge could conceivably, but
seldom do, arise in a wage earner's plan. The major problem lies
with the fifth ground, which is that the debtor "has been granted
a discharge within six years prior to the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding, or had a composition or an arrangement
by way of composition or a wage earner's by way of composition
confirmed under the act."'54
Because of the frequent existence of prior discharges occurring
within six years, the question whether the fifth ground is ap-
plicable to a wage earner's petition and comes within the re-
quisites for confirmation is serious and debatable. The issue arises
because the great majority of plans filed ask for extension, not
composition. 55 The early cases on whether a discharge in a former
bankruptcy was a bar to the confirmation of a wage earner plan
were in conflict,56 but this conflict was settled by a recent Supreme
Court decision. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co.5T held that a
discharge in bankruptcy granted within six years of the filing of
the petition was not grounds for dismissal or refusal to confirm
the plan; the Court reasoned that the fifth ground of section
14 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act was in conflict with the provisions of
the sections in Chapter XIII and, therefore, not controlling.58
54 Id. at § 82(5).55 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 408 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).56 Compare In re Sharpe, 205 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1962), and In re
Mahaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960), with In re Schlageeter, 319 F.2d
821 (3rd Cir. 1963), and In re Bingham, 190 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. Kan. 1960).
57 383 U.S. 392 (1966).58 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1938).
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The Court, relying on the Congressional Record, found the
intent of Congress in passing Chapter XIII was "to give the wage
earner a reasonable opportunity to arrange installment payments
to be made out of the future earnings." Rather than to have them
go into straight bankruptcy, Congress intended "to encourage wage
earners to pay their debts in full by offering two inducements:
(1) Avoidance of an adjudication of bankruptcy with its attendant
stigma; and, at the same time, (2) temporary freedom, during
the extension, from garnishment, attachments and other harass-
ment by creditors." The Court said that, in view of the purposes
of Chapter XIII, it did not think Congress intended to apply the
six-year bar of section 14 (c) (5) to the confirmation of wage earner
extension plans. The Court stated that the "unmistakable purpose
of the six-year provision was to prevent the creation of a class of
habitual bankrupts-debtors who might repeatedly escape their
obligations as frequently as they chose by going through repeated
bankruptcy." But the Court said, "an extension plan has no
escape hatch for debtors, it is a method by which, without re-
sorting to bankruptcy proceedings, in the usual sense a wage
earner may meet the claims of creditors." The Court continued,
"it is true, that section 660 provides for a discharge after com-
pliance with the provisions of Chapter XIII plan," and further
commented that, "while this section applies to wage earner
compositions as well as to extensions, a 'discharge' thereunder has
a wholly different impact where an extension is involved. In the
latter case a discharge is little more than a mere formality." The
Court concluded that, if at the end of three years the debtor has
not paid all his obligations under the plan and the referee is
contemplating granting a discharge under section 660, then at
that time an objecting creditor may raise section 14 (c) (5) as a
bar to relief.5°
In a recent seventh circuit case, the court, citing the Perry
case, held that the dismissal of a straight bankruptcy petition
could not be based upon a discharge which had been granted at
the completion of an extension plan under Chapter XIII. Even
though this discharge was granted within six years of the filing of
the straight bankruptcy petition, the court pointed out that the
59H.R. RFP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 § 1 (1937) quoted in
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966).
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wording of section 14 clearly indicated that the only discharge
under Chapter XIII which would bar a petition brought in
straight bankruptcy was one that called for composition rather
than extension. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court
had termed a discharge granted at the end of an extension plan a
"formal one." °
This result may be supported by considering the Act's history.
When the Chandler Act was being enacted, question was raised
whether the reorganization sections came within the constitutional
power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcy throughout the United States.61 An essential to past
legislation and thinking on the "subject of bankruptcy" had been
the giving of a discharge, and it could be argued that the authors
of the Chandler Act and section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, to
settle any question, provided for discharge even though it was a
mere formality in a Chapter XIII petition where the plan was for
extension only and all the debts had been paid.62
Assuming that a debtor complies with the provisions of a
confirmed plan, the court enters an order discharging him from
all debts and liabilities provided for by the plan. However, this
does not affect the debts which are not dischargeable under section
17 of the Bankruptcy Act, unless the creditors concerned accepted
the plan.6 After three years, if the court is satisfied that the fail-
ure of the debtor to complete his payments is due to circumstances
for which he could not be justly held accountable, it will enter an
order discharging his debts, exclusive of the above mentioned
debts, provided that the creditors involved have accepted the
plan.64 This discharge feature of Chapter XIII petitions might
seem to be in conflict with Perry. However, as the Court mention-
ed in Perry, if the plan is an extension-type and the payments are
made in accordance with it, there are no debts to be discharged.5
If, on the other hand, the plan filed is a composition-type, then it
60 Barnes v. Maley, 360 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1966).
61 Id. at 924.
62 See Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Illinois v. C.R.I. &
P.R.R., 294 U.S. 647 (1934).
63 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1938).
6 4 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1938).
65 Temajority opinion in Perry calls a discharge under a Chapter X1I
extension a "mere fornality" even though a creditor who does not file a claim
may lose his right to recover the debt. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S.
392, 403 (1966).
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is classified as a bankruptcy proceeding. Finally, if the plan
started out as an extension-type which was subsequently converted
at the end of three years into a composition-type, then, at that
time, the creditor could challenge the discharge if it would be
received within six years of the previous discharge. Of course,
after the discharge has been granted under either section 661 or
section 660, the final step is for the court to issue an order dis-
charging the trustee and closing the estate. 0
II. THE HISTORY OF CHAPTER XIII
In Perry, Justice Clark stressed the history and background of
Chapter XIII in ascertaining the intent of Congress. 7 The history
of Chapter XIII begins even before the date cited in the Perry
case. In 1933, the year spoken of as the "depth of the depression,"
there were so many no-aset petitions filed by wage earners in
Birmingham, Alabama, that alarm spread through not only the
business community but the bar as well. After consulting with
Valentine J. Nesbit, a prominent Birmingham attorney, and some
of the Birmingham creditor associations, Federal District Judge
W. I. Grubb apparently decided that a partial solution might lie
in a liberal interpretation of section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act. 8
As a beginning, Judge Grubb appointed Mr. Nesbit as referee in
bankruptcy to handle only section 74 petitions. After Judge Nes-
mit's death, Clarence W. Allgood was appointed as referee to
handle these particular petitions. Judge Allgood is now judge of
the Federal District for the Northern District of Alabama. In
response to my letter asking him about the early history of these
proceedings in Birmingham, he wrote the following:
Your letter of June 10, with regard to Chapter 18 pro-
ceedings in this district prior to 1938, has been called to my
attention upon my return to the city.
You are correct as to the early use of Sections 12 and 74, in
the Northern District of Alabama. Judge W. I. Grubb, United
0 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1062 (1938).
67 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, at 404 (1966).8 WADE, USE OF CHAPTm 13 OF Tm BANumrrcr Acr-1958 SUNM.Any,
OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGAL Am N DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
40 (1958). Early rumblings were heard in 1932 when President Roosevelt sent
Congress a message on bankruptcy administration. See Strengthening of Pro-
cedure in the Judicial System, The Report of the Attorney General on Bank-
ruptcy Law and Administration, S. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
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States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama,
due to considerable concern shown to him by local business-
men over the ever-increasing volume of bankruptcy at that
time, became convinced that something could and should be
done in order to lessen the pressure of bankruptcies on the
business community as a whole in the Birmingham area.
Judge Grubb, so I am informed, consulted with credit
managers, lawyers and representatives of the larger employ-
ers of labor in this district and came to the conclusion that
the wage earners (who filed most of the bankruptcy peti-
tions), if given an opportunity to do so, would pay their
debts in full. He, therefore, appointed the Honorable Valen-
tine J. Nesbit as a Special Referee in Bankruptcy to set up a
separate court in an effort to work out some solution to the
problem.
Lawyers and business men cooperated with Judge Nesbit,
and many wage earners were encouraged to file petitions
under Sections 12 and 74.
As you know, Section 12 was not effective because the
jurisdiction of the court was terminated upon the confirma-
tion of a composition and the court was left with no procedure
for the enforcement of the terms of settlement during the
period of extension or modification in the terms of settlement
that sometimes becomes necessary in order to meet unfore-
seen and unavoidable changes in the wage earner's earnings
and circumstances. It was also found that administration costs
in this type of proceeding were entirely too high and all costs
and priorities had to be deposited in cash in advance of con-
firmation. Section 74 did provide for retention of jurisdiction
by the court during the period of extension for the purpose
of enforcing the terms. Here also, however, the administration
costs were entirely too high and certain cash deposits also had
to be made in advance of confirmation.
To be perfectly frank, Judge Nesbit, with the advice and
consent of the creditors and the District Judge, manufactured
procedures in an attempt to eliminate the objections to Sec-
tions 12 and 74. Judge Nesbit primarily took the position that
once a plan had been worked out for a wage earner and ac-
cepted by his creditors it then became the duty of the court
to see that the debtor or bankrupt carried out the plan by
making prompt payments of the amount agreed upon. When
a debtor failed to make payments as agreed upon, the Referee
would issue an order on this individual's future earnings
which in effect caused the employer to either make a de-
duction of the monthly payments or send the employee's en-
tire earnings into court where the deduction was made.
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This procedure was frowned upon by the appellate courts.
However, it was desirable and everyone felt that it was
necessary in order to successfully conclude a reasonable per-
centage of the cases filed. Therefore, when the Chandler Act
was written, many of the special procedures developed by
the Referees in Birmingham were adopted and written into
the new Chandler Act.
As you know, I was appointed a Referee just a few months
before the enactment of the Chandler Act into law. I was
thoroughly familiar with the provisions of Chapter 13 and put
most of them into effect prior to the actual effective date of
the Act.
Due to the tremendous increase in the volume of Chapter
13 cases in this district and to the highly efficient manner in
which Referees Herbert Maulitz and William R. Vance are
operating in Birmingham, I would suggest that you let me
set up an appointment for you to visit with them for as many
days as you might see fit. Really it is difficult for one to
visualize the size of the operation here and the highly
efficient manner in which it is being conducted. All of the
bookkeeping, including disbursement to creditors, is ac-
complished by IBM equipment.69
The early use of section 74 as a makeshift is more easily under-
stood if it is remembered that the conferences held by Judge
Grubb with employers, credit managers, and lawyers were con-
ducted in the depression era of 1933. Section 74 had only recently
been added to the Bankruptcy Act on March 3, 1933.70 As
originally passed, section 74 contemplated that a businessman
should be permitted to pay an amount less than the actual debt
as a composition or, alternatively, be granted an extension of
time. This law provided that, if a debtor defaulted on any pay-
ment and the court had retained jurisdiction, it would appoint a
trustee, nominated by either the creditors or the court, to
liquidate the estate. However, no order, liquidation, or ad-
judication was to be instituted by or against a wage earner or a
person engaged chiefly in farming. This last exclusion was prob-
ably the one that was liberally interpreted by Judge Grubb and
Referee Nesbit.71 Without such an interpretation, the law did not
69 judge Allgood is presently judge of the federal district court for the
Northern District of Alabama.7oBankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 203 (1938).
71 ibid.
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protect the debtor from repeated garnishment proceedings, and
in 1935 a bill for the relief of harassed wage earners was intro-
duced. It led to a three-year study of the Bankruptcy Law, which
culminated in the 1938 Chandler Act.7 2
From this historical perspective, it seems obvious that the
congressional intent of Chapter XIII was to provide a solution
that would allow the wage earner an opportunity to pay his debts,
without being subjected to garnishment and other harassment by
his creditors. In both section 74 and Chapter XIII, the petitioner
is called a debtor and is not adjudicated a bankrupt unless he
defaults in the payments required to be made under the terms
of the extension. It seems clear that this is not so much a bank-
ruptcy proceeding as it is an insolvency proceeding for the relief
of poor debtors, similar to that used in England. 3
Perhaps the true intent of Congress in passing this piece of
"forgotten man" legislation can best be summed up in the
statement made on the floor of the House by Alabama Congress-
man Sam Hobbs on August 10, 1937. In answer to a question the
Congressman said:
There are thousands of wage earners all over this land who
desire to pay their honest debts but who cannot. For the
first time we have the machinery set up in this bill whereby
a court order is issued to stay all creditors' action against wage
earners. A hearing is had, he sits at the table with his credi-
tors and the judge and they decide how much he and his
family need to live on during the pendency of the settlement
and then, in the most friendly way, they arrive at how much
he can pay into the treasury for the benefit of his creditors
to be distributed week by week. That has been done under a
voluntary system that has grown up in Birmingham, Alabama,
under the blessing of the late Judge Grubb and the directing
hand, brain, and heart of Judge Valentine J. Nesbit, wherein
some two thousand cases it has worked out and the creditors
have gotten dollar for dollar of what was due.74
72 Cbandler, The Wage Earners' Plan: Its Purpose, 15 VAND. L. REv. 169
(1961).
73Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors in England, 1813, 53 Geo. 3, c.
102. Amended, 1818, 54 Geo. 3, c. 23. In the early part of the nineteenth
century, England had two courts, the Court of Bankruptcy and an Insolvency
Court for the relief of poor debtors who, not being traders, could not be
adjudged bankrupt.
74 81 CONG. REC. 8647 (1937) (remarks of Representative Hobbs).
(Vol. 55,
CHAP= X WAGE EAwaN PLANs
III. THE USE OF CHAPTER XIII
Since Chapter XIII was the result of experiments carried on
cooperatively by the bench, the bar, the large employers, and
creditor groups of Birmingham, it is not surprising that from the
beginning wage earner plans have been more operative there than
in the rest of the country. Birmingham has developed a reputation
for being the Chapter XIII capital of the country. A study of the
articles dealing with this part of the law and the letters to this
author from interested officials nation-wide shows the impression
is still prevalent that Birmingham is "the place" where Chapter
XIII is used and that the use made in other areas is inconse-
quential. However, this opinion is not shared by people who are
informed of recent facts. In 1948, only ten years after the passage
of Chapter XIII there were 3,315 wage-earner petitions filed in
the whole country, and 3,006 of these were filed in Alabama. The
same result would probably hold true if the years between 1938-48
were examined. However, in 1965 there were a total of 28,000 of
these petitions filed in the United Stats, only 7,804 of which were
filed in the state of Alabama. Thus the increase has been rather
rapid in the rest of the country while the percent increase in
Alabama has been quite low.75 The figures and charts which are
appended to this article 76 indicate rather clearly that the nation-
wide need for Chapter XIII is becoming more recognized, but
that Birmingham recognized the need for Chapter XIII pro-
cedure even before the law was passed, thereby effecting a rather
uniform use over the years charted. The line representing Chapter
XIII petitions and the line representing the total voluntary bank-
ruptcy petitions filed in Alabama have followed very parallel pat-
terns over these years.
The chart which compares the growth of the use of Chapter
XIII petitions with the growth of voluntary bankruptcy petitions
indicates that the nation has not made as effective use of Chapter
XIII in relationship to the total number of voluntary petitions as
has the state of Alabama.77 In examining these charts, which are
7G All statistics as to the number of petitions fled are based upon tables found
in the annual report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts.
70 Chart B of the appendix to this article. See Maulitz, Operations Under
Chapter XIII, 27 REF. J. 268 (1958).77 Chart A of the appendix to this article.
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compiled from the number of petitions filed, it should be borne in
mind that there has been a 47% increase in population during this
same period of time. There should be a larger total number of
petitions filed since there are more people in the country. How-
ever, it might be alarming to realize that, with 47% increase in
population during this time, we have had an increase in voluntary
bankruptcy petitions filed from just under 18,000 in 1948 to an
all time high of 178,980 filed in 1965. Compare this increase with
the statistics in Alabama where Chapter XIII has been effectively
used over the same period of time. Voluntary petitions in Alabama
have increased from just under 4,000 to just under 10,000. It might
be assumed from these facts that the effective use over the years
of wage-earner plans has resulted in a wage-earner-debtor-society
more stable than any found elsewhere.
This assumption, however, loses its support when a series of
other tables are considered and Alabama is compared to North
Carolina. From the chart which ranks the states according to the
ratio of employee bankruptcies per population figure, it is ob-
served that in the state of North Carolina, which ranks number
51 on this chart, there is one employee bankruptcy filed for every
36,743 people. And additional charts show that in Alabama there
is a Chapter XIII petition for every 418 people in the state, while
in North Carolina there is a Chapter XIII petition for every
53.119 people,78 and that of the employee bankruptcies that are
filed as Chapter XIII petitions, 72% of the empolyees chose this
route in Alabama, whereas in North Carolina only 14% of the
insolvent wage-earners chose Chapter XIII. Thus North Carolina
has both a much lower total of employee bankruptcies and a lower
percentage of Chapter XIII petitions than Alabama. There might
be some way to explain this in terms of numbers of petitions filed
in these two states in proportion to the earning power of the popu-
lation. The argument would be that there are more poorly paid
wage-earners in Alabama than in North Carolina. However, this
argument seems to lose validity when it is noted that both Ala-
bama and North Carolina are in the lower group of states when
ranked by per capita income. In a table included in the ap-
pendix, 9 the states are ranked in this fashion and are divided into
78 Chart F of the appendix to this article.
79 Table G of the appendix to this article.
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four groups, the first including the 12 states that have a per capita
income under $2,000, the second an income from $2,000 to $2,500,
the third from $2,500 to $3,000, and the fourth from $3,000 to
$3,544. Yet of the twelve states ranking at the top in the ratio of
employment bankruptcy to population, only three of these states
are in the lowest group of per capita income.
It would seem, then, that we cannot look to low pay as the
reason for the increase in employee bankruptcies. Rather, the
literature on Chapter XIII petitions and the replies to question-
naires which were distributed nationwide to clerks of the federal
district courts reveal that the adequacy of state laws freeing wages
from garnishment are thought to decrease employee bankruptcies.
In a Quarterly Report article, Professor Max Siporon states that in
every wage-earner petition he examined, there existed pressure
from the creditors in the form of continuous phone calls, wage
garnishments, lawsuits, and other forms of harassment.80
In order to examine the premise that adequate state laws free-
ing wages from garnishment will eliminate the need for the use
of Chapter XIII petitions, this article contains a chart of the
various state laws exempting wages from garnishment to ascer-
tain whether there is a pattern which would support this thesis.,.
A problem here is that garnishment laws and the exemption of
wages under them are so variable that it becomes almost impos-
sible to classify or rank the states. For example, in some instances
where the state law seems to protect the wage-earner in this
fashion, the simultaneous allowance of multiple garnishments
would seem to foster rather than dissuade the filing of Chapter
XIII petitions.8 2 The limited studies which might permit ranking
states by leniency toward exemption of wages seem to show that
only four states had statutes providing for the appointment of a
trustee to receive the nonexempt portion of a debtor's wages and
to pay this to the creditor. These statutes are so similar to a wage-
80 Siporin, A Study of Bankruptcy Court Debtors, 20 Q. REPORT 92 (1966);
see also Nadler, Rehabilitation of the Insolvent Wage-Earner Under the Bank-
ruptcy Act: A Challenge to Minnesota, 42 MwN. L. REv. 877, 386 (1958).
See Walker, Is Chapter 13 a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State, 38
REF. J. 7, 8 (1959). In this article, Referee Walker states: "State statutory ex-
emptions furnish a strong motivation against Chapter XIII. This is particularly
true where the state exemptions are very liberal as they are in California.'81 Chart C in the appendix to this article.
82Josin, Debtor's Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 84 1m. U.
855 (1959).
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earner's petition that they would probably be used instead of the
petition since they are considerably cheaper.8 3
The testing of this thesis is inconclusive when we again con-
sider the table ranking states by percentage of employee bank-
ruptcies filed under Chapter XIII. Examining the first 22 of these
states, which include all of the states where more than 10% of the
employee bankruptcies are filed under Chapter XIII, we find
that 12 of the 22 states would be classified as having laws which
adequately protect the wage-earner's salary from excessive ganrish-
ment. In defining "adequate" protection, a dividing point has
been used of a $75 exemption of a $100 salary per week. Indeed,
it would be a rare situation where a referee in bankruptcy would
approve a plan allocating less than 25% of the wage-earner's pay
to his creditors.8 4 It is interesting to note that of the 22 high-
ranking states two had laws which seemed more favorable than
Chapter XIII protection and that the other two states having such
laws are ranked 23rd and 25th.
It would be fair to categorize a state as a "non-Chapter XIII
state," if less than 10% of its employee bankruptcies are filed
under Chapter XIII. Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma
would be included in this group. This is to be expected. In Texas
current wages are not subject to garnishment if they are the wages
of a head of a family. In Oklahoma the earnings received for
services rendered within thirty days cannot be garnished if it is
shown that the money is necessary for the upkeep of the debtor's
family. And in Pennsylvania all wages are exempt.
The picture becomes quite clouded, however, when it is
realized that Indiana is included in the "non-Chapter XIII states"
and that Indiana protects only $25 at any one time and even then
the wage-earner must be a householder. Similarly North Dakota
83Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALI.. L. REv. 1214, at 1226 (1965). In addition to Ohio and Wisconsin
which are cited in this article, see Mich. Stats. Ann. §§ 27.2441-53 and Code of
Virginia §§ 8-441-449.3 (1966). A study of this subject in California was made
by the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California at
Berkeley. It later became the basis for an article by Mr. George Brunn of the
California Bar. Mr. Brunn describes a situation that exists in San Francisco, which
would seem to indicate that the California law exempting wages is far from
adequate and that the use of these laws by creditors in the San Francisco area
would certainly cause people to file a Chapter XIII petition.84For a mathematical approach to the percentage of a wage-earner's wages
which can be allocated to his creditors with feasibility, see Meth, Ethical and
Economic Considerations in Chapter 13 Proceedings, 36 REF. J. 41 (1962).
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protects only $35 a week for the head of a family, and Wyoming
and Nevada protect 50% of the earnings.
In summary, a study of these charts indicates some correlation
between the relative nonuse of Chapter XIII petitions and the
existence of a state statute which exempts wages from garnishment.
However, there are many states which have adequate protection
for wages, but which also have many employee bankruptcies and
many Chapter XIII petitions. Clearly, the adequacy of state pro-
tection against wage garnishment is not a complete answer to the
problem.
Chart "C" represents an attempt to list the average amount of
attorney fees in Chapter XIII proceedings. Of course, the attorney
cannot receive more than the reasonable fee approved by the
Referee. 5 It would seem, however, that the varying attitudes of
the bar toward Chapter XIII might be reflected in the high or low
amount set in the local bar's minimum fee schedule. Further, it
would seem that in places where the attorney's fee for filing a
Chapter XIII petition was considerably lower than the fee for
filing a straight asset or nonasset bankruptcy case then this would
tend to decrease the number of Chapter XIII petitions filed.
Data on the usual fee allowed should also indicate the attitude of
the referee, which, in turn, should also have bearing on the filing
of Chapter XIII petitions.
Seeking this and other information, the author wrote letters
to the clerks of the various Federal District Courts and to the
"standing trustees" on Chapter XIII petitions. The data obtained
is not complete. In some instances the fee shown is given in two
different figures because different answers were received in the
same state from different locations. For example, the minimum fee
for filing a Chapter XIII petition and for filing a straight bank-
ruptcy in Utica, New York, which is in the Western District, is
5150. However, in one city in the Eastern District, there is no
recommended minimum fee for filing a Chapter XIII petition,
although the schedule calls for a $300 fee for a voluntary petition.
85Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1059 (1938) provides that prior to distribu-
tion to creditors certain priorities shall first be paid in full out of the money paid
in by or for the debtor. After listing the first three priorities, the act states, "or
such reasonable fee to the attorney for the debtor as the court may allowv for
the professional services rendered by such attorney to the debtor in connection
with the proceedings under this Chapter."
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Obviously there will be few wage-earner petitions filed under
Chapter XIII in those areas where the local bar exacts a high fee.
At the beginning of the Alabama experiment in 1933, prior to
the Chandler Act, the court appointed a special referee to handle
only wage-earner cases, and now in the Northern District of Ala-
bama two referees handle nothing but Chapter XIII cases. The
effectiveness of wage-earner plans in the Birmingham area in-
dicates the value of having specialized referees. At the present
time, the Alabama referees are the only two in the country
handling solely Chapter XIII cases, although in Georgia's middle
district (Atlanta) virtually all cases arising under Chapter XIII
are handled by Referee W. Homer Drake. Clearly, the attitude of
the referee 6 has a great deal to do with the success of Chapter
XIII in a particular locality. A lawyer is not apt to advise a client
to file such a petition if he knows that the referee who will be
called upon to confirm the plan is hostile to it. In Northern
California 16% of the employee bankruptcies filed in 1964-65
were Chapter XIII petitions, while in Southern California only
13% were Chapter XIII petitions. The state as a whole, averaged
a little better than 14%. The 3% difference between the Northern
and the Southern parts of the state certainly cannot be explained
by saying that there are less people in Southern California who
are Chapter XIII prospects. Referee Rollo Walker of Los Angeles
has stated that he had no personal hostility toward the utilization
of Chapter XIII where circumstances were appropriate and the
debtor's choice of remedy was voluntarily made. However, Re-
feree Walker made other statements which might be indicative of
hostility toward Chapter XIII petitions.87
Another example of the impact of a referee's attitude might
be indicated by the experience in Georgia. While there has been
no hostility in the Northern or Middle Districts, the referee for
the Southern District definitely favors Chapter XIII petitions.88
As a result of this publicized attitude of Referee McDuffey, it is
86 See Snedecor, Chapter XIII Wage Earners' Plans, 14 REF. J. 83 (1939),
for the statement that referees generally thought Chapter XI1 a noble experiment,
yet some still opposed it. One referee reportedly stated that a lawyer who
advised a client to take Chapter XIII ought to be disbarred.87 Walker, Is Chapter 18 a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State, 33
REF. J. 7 (1959).88 MeDuffee, The Wage Earners Plan in Practice, 15 VANm. L. REv. 173
(1961).
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possible that attorneys felt more inclined to file Chapter XIII
petitions in the Southern District. Last year there were 609
Chapter XIII petitions filed in the Northern District, 1,001 in
the Middle District, and 1,140 in the Southern District. This is
even more impressive when it is realized that Atlanta is in the
Middle District. In an article by Referee McDuffey, another
referee is quoted as saying that he was "firmly convinced that
Chapter XIII would be successfully used only where the referee
is thoroughly trained in its use and is willing to dedicate himself
towards doing a real job that will benefit both himself and his
community," and that much to his surprise, "I have found that
some referees have never read Chapter XIII, do not have the
faintest idea of its purpose, and probably have not read the Bank-
ruptcy Act."8' 9 Since the Atlanta district now has a referee
practically specializing in Chapter XIII petitions, it is probable
that the number of petitions filed in the Middle District of
Georgia will increase rapidly in the next few years.
It is surprising to note that, in 1965, 799 Chapter XIII peti-
tions had been filed in the state of Maine out of 1,481 employee
bankruptcies. There do not seem to be any economic reasons for
this relatively high use of Chapter XIII petitions in Maine.
Surely, the reasons for the high number of the Chapter XIII
petitions in Alabama, as given by some text-writers, would not be
applicable in Maine.90 In answer to the form letters addressed to
the clerks of the U.S. District Courts, Judge Richard E. Poulos,
referee in bankruptcy in Portland, Maine gave an informative
reply. He enclosed a copy of a talk he had made to the Maine
State Bar Association in 1963. Some of the statements made it clear
that the success of Chapter XIII in Maine was due almost entirely
to the attitudes of Referee Poulos and his predecessor, Justice
Charles A. Pomeroy. In his talk, he pointed out that Chapter
XIII proceedings were first used in Maine in 1952 and that
Justice Pomeroy had initiated these despite initial opposition and
skepticism from various creditors. Referee Poulos stated that "one
of the most tragic features of this pressing problem is that the
89 Id. at 177.
90 HANNA & MAcLAc LAN, CASFS ON CSmrroR's RaRs AND CouPoRAT
BE-ORGANIZATION 34 (5th ecl. 1957). Attention is called to the fact that a 'large
portion of the applicants reportedly are Negroes, a group which generally cannot
-afford legal relief in numbers proportionate to its share of the o56pulation."
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American public, commendably, is very honest and wishes to pay
its bills provided a reasonable system exists.... It has been my
experience that initiating straight bankruptcy proceedings is
generally one of the worst mistakes an individual can make be-
cause, as many of us know, such persons end up owing nearly as
much money after bankruptcy as they did before bankruptcy."
Judge Poulos went on to say that under the present structure of
the laws in this country the only satisfactory remedy is the
Chapter XIII petition. By reading his speech, one easily sees that
Judge Poulos is proud that Maine was by far the leading state in
New England in the use of Chapter XIII petitions. The 1962
statistics showed Maine with 757 Chapter XIII petitions and the
other northeastern states with a combined total of only 50. The
situation has remained approximately the same because the 1965
statistics show Maine with 799 petitions and 15 in the other New
England states. Judge Poulos claimed that "as a result of this
program, Maine has successfully arrested the spiraling volume of
straight bankruptcy matters which prevails in all other parts of
the nation."
Judge Poulos informed the members of the Maine bar that
this procedure was not unduly burdensome on the referee if a
knowledgeable "standing trustee" is appointed. To lessen the work
of the referee in Maine, there are two "standing trustees," one in
the Southern Division in Portland, Mr. J. S. Cope, and one in the
Northern Division in Bangor, Mr. Glen Ray Mooney. Both of
these trustees are members of the Maine Bar and perform nearly
all of the legal work required after the filing of the proceeding.
The Maine experience should be considered by referees in other
parts of the country, especially referees who have been laboring
under the misconception that this proceeding is one for people in
the southern states only. The referee and the standing trustees in
Maine can be justifiably proud of the record they have set in
making this procedure available to the harassed wage earners in
their state.91
To make effective use of Chapter XIII, a special referee should
91 Evidently, Judge Poulos does not think a full-time referee is necessary if
the trustee is an attorney "skilled in the art of bankruptcy law." Of the 63
standing trustees, 18 are attorneys. In Kansas, the standing trustee, Attorney
Claude L. Rice, located in Kansas City, with 2,961 cases pending, undoubtedly
makes decisions which, in Birmingham, would be handled by the referee.
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be appointed to handle these cases where potentially 1,000 wage-
earner petitions may be filed in a year. Although in few areas
would 70% of employee petitions be filed as wage-earner petitions,
as is now the case in Alabama, it would seem that at least a
third of the employee petitions would be Chapter XIII petitions,
if the choice were adequately put to the wage earner and the cost
of filing the petition were not unreasonable. Using one-third as
a test, it would seem feasible and practical to have a referee ap-
pointed to handle nothing but wage-earner petitions in New York,
Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Illinois,
Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, Orgeon, Washington, Colorado, and
California. There would be 1,000 wage-earner petitions filed in
Kansas, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Minnesota, if a 40% rule were
used.
New York, of course, is a prize example of non-use. Out of
4,765 employee petitions, only 38 were Chapter XIII petitions.
This could be caused by lack of encouragement from the referees,
and the high suggested minimum fee set by the Bar for filing one
of these petitions. The fee could be held down by a referee in-
terested in making this service more available to the debtors of
New York State.
An economic reason for using 1,000 petitions as a guideline for
the appointment of a special referee for Chapter XIII petitions is
that a $35 filing fee on each petition would produce $35,000 to
cover the expense of this office. The expense of the trustee ap-
pointed to handle the plans is in turn borne entirely by the
debtor, and with 1,000 petitions a year the procedure would be
self-supporting. Referee McDuffey has listed the elements of a
formula for Chapter XIII success:
(1) a referee dedicated to rehabilitation; (2) use of full in-
junctive powers against the creditor; (3) use against the
debtor of full injunctive powers forbidding the creation of
any credit obligations without the consent of the Court; (4)
methods of assuring control over the debtor's paycheck; (5)
maximum deposits by debtor; (6) a dedicated trustee: (a)
full-time or justified (b) adequately compensated (c) prompt
in remittance to creditors; (7) a bankruptcy bar sharing the
qualities of dedication suggested for the referee and trus-
tee; (8) a type of debtor who seeks out the court of bank-
ruptcy not as a sanctuary, asylum or place of refuge, but
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as a means of learning (perhaps for the first time) the hard
lesson of self-discipline; (9) prompt dismissal where the case
justifies it; (10) continuing education workshops, seminars,
forums. Chapter XIII is a rehabilitation device. Therefore,
while we have stressed here the advantages of our economy
of increased use of Chapter XIII, the rehabilitation of the
debtor continues to be the prime objective in all appropriate
and proper cases. 92
Chapter XIII should be used with a curative purpose in mind.
However, there are "credit drunks" who cannot resist buying on
credit if items are offered to them. These people need more of a
permanent trusteeship to solve their problems. Dr. M. R. Neifeld,
who for thirty-five years was vice-president and economist for the
Beneficial Finance System, one of the largest finance companies in
the world, states that since 1941 the "credit drunk" has been
recognized as a neurotic who can no more resist buying on credit
than can a compulsive gambler resist gambling, or a narcotic
addict resist drugs, or an alcoholic resist drink. Dr. Neifeld cites
books by professional psychiatrists who have recognized and
isolated these maladjusted people as a class. He states that these
people deliberately involve themselves because of psychiatric
compulsions, but that, on the other hand, there are many normal
people who also find themselves involved with excessive debts be-
cause of changes in income, unexpected illnesses, or simply mis-
management of their finances. These people can be rehabilitated,
but the credit drunk cannot be, at least on a one-shot basis.93
IV. REHABILITATION AND SANCTUARY
In light of Referee McDuffey's formula, it is tempting to con-
clude that, if debtors are using Chapter XIII as an "asylum or
place of refuge," the injunctive power forbidding the creation of
credit obligations is perhaps being overlooked. An injunction,
however, is difficult to effectuate since the enforcement procedure
depends upon holding the debtor in contempt. This would dis-
rupt the plan. The only other alternative would be to dismiss the
proceeding. As a practical matter, it seems that the debtor should
92 McDuffey, The Wage Earners' Plan in Practice, 15 Vuwm. L. REv. 173,
193 (1961).
93 Neifeld, The Credit Drunk, 20 Q. REPonr 56 (1966).
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be cautioned against new obligations, but enjoining him from
creating more debts without permission of the Court would be
asking for trouble.
An attempt should be made to rehabilitate the "credit drunk"
if possible, but if it is found that he cannot be cured, society
should not completely abandon him. Unlike the situation in
bankruptcy, if a wage earner files a petition under Chapter XIII
and his plan is terminated by payment of all of his debts in less
than three years, it is hard to see any reason why he should not
be given this sanctuary a second time. In fact, courts have re-
cognized that an extension plan under Chapter XIII and the
resulting discharge are not to be considered as a discharge in
bankruptcy which would bar a second discharge within the six-
year limitation. Should a second petition come before a referee,
his only grounds for refusing to confirm it would be that it is not
feasible. Merely because a man has previously participated in a
similar plan does not make a second plan less feasible. Indeed, the
contrary would seem to be true. Of course, if final rehabilitation
is the only purpose of Chapter XIII, then another plan would not
be feasible. But the history of Chapter XIII and the intent of
Congress indicate that the purpose was not merely to rehabilitate,
but also to protect the wage-earner from harassment while af-
fording him an opportunity to pay his debts.
A recent sampling of 300 petitions filed in Birmingham during
one year indicated that 66% of the wage earners filing petitions
were repeaters. Of these 300, 4 had previously gone through
straight bankruptcy and the petition was their first under Chapter
XIII; 72 of the 300 had filed a Chapter XIII petition before, and
this was their second petition; 22 were currently on their third
petition; 28 on their fifth; 23 on their sixth; 15 on their seventh;
1 on his eighth; 5 on their ninth; 1 on his tenth and 1 on his
twelfth petition. A referee in Birmingham said he remembered
one man who had filed thirteen petitions.
This test sampling shows that the referees in Birmingham who
handle Chapter XIII petitions exclusively are furnishing a sanc-
tuary, asylum, or place of refuge as well as rendering the desired
rehabilitation service. This is a service which was certainly within
the intent of Congress when it enacted the law. The only question
is whether the extent of asylum is necessary in this particular
1967]
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federal district. Anyone who questions the need for the service
should first ask himself how many times in the last twenty years
he has become overloaded with debts and borrowed enough to
pay off everyone. In our present economy, where it seems un-
patriotic to be out of debt, stones should not be thrown at
Chapter XIII repeaters when typical upper-class procedure is to
borrow a lump sum at the bank. Many wage-earners' petitions
are made under the pressure of several thousand dollars of debt.
The debtor cannot go to the bank and borrow this much money.
He must use the only device open to himf 4
When it was found that the number of repeaters ran as high
as 66% in the Birmingham district, it was thought that data on
repeater experience in other districts would be valuable. The
Bankruptcy Section of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts retained the names of all Chapter XIII
standing trustees who would have enough accounts to give
meaningful repeater statistics. There were 63 of these standing
trustees, all of whom were questioned. They were asked to provide
information on accounts similar to the information gathered in
Birmingham.
In answer to the questionnaires, 43 replies were received. The
majority indicated a very small number of repeaters. However,
most of these standing trustees had been working less than five
years. It cannot be expected that many repeaters will be found
until a trustee has been operating for at least ten years. It is
interesting to note that while there were practically no Chapter
XIII repeaters in Los Angeles Mr. William R. Martin estimated
that approximately 15% of all Chapter XIII petitions were filed
by people who had been in straight bankruptcy within six years.
A similar situation was indicated by Mr. Ronald W. Williams,
trustee in Danville, Virginia. Mr. Williams stated that he had
been trustee since 1963 and there were few repeaters. He esti-
mated, however, that 50% of his Chapter XIII petitioners had
previously filed petitions in straight bankruptcy.
The standing trustee in Kansas City, Mr. Claude L. Rice,
stated that all of his accounts were on IBM cards, making it
94 This sampling was accomplished by examining the last 100 petitions filed,
the first 100 petitions one year ago, and lastly, 100 petitions fied at the midpoint
of the year. By actual count, the per cent of repeat petitions proved to be 65.4q.
CHATER X WAGE EATnam PLANS
possible to provide an accurate count of repeaters over a period of
ten years. The result of this data processing study showed that
out of a total of 9,524 petitions filed there were 8,860 first time
petitions, 535 second time petitions, 101 third time petitions, 19
fourth time petitions, 5 fifth time petitions, 1 sixth time petition
and 1 ninth time petition-a total of 664 repeaters in the ten
year period.
The trustee in Wichita, Mr. Royce E. Wallace, along with
Mr. Rice, also estimates his present repeaters to be about 10%
of the petitions filed. On the assumption that there would be
relatively few repeaters in the first five years, the following
theoretical experience chart was drawn based on the Kansas City
study. It is founded on the assumption that after the first five
years the repeat petitions will amount to 1% a year for each of the
ten years. It was then assumed that the number of repeaters would
remain a constant percent of the potential repeaters. By using the
actual petitions filed in the last fifteen years and 1% as a constant
proportion of the number of potential repeaters who file in each
year, the final result is a total of 666. This is remarkably close to
the 664 which were actually discovered. Unfortunately, the
statistical data was not programmed to the point where it could
be told exactly how many of these repeaters filed petitions in the
particular years. To be mathematically accurate, the increase in
potential repeaters should be reduced by the year's repeaters.
THEORETICAL KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE
1% of
Potential Potential
Petitions Equals Number Repeaters Repeaters
Year Percent Filed of Repeaters In Year Each Year
1965 10 1,245 124 12,826 128
1964 9 1,375 124 11,451 114
1963 8 1,406 112 10,045 100
1962 7 1,122 114 8,423 84
1961 6 1,852 111 6,571 65
1960 5 1,257 62 5,314 53
1959 4 1,140 45 4,174 41
1958 3 1,175 35 2,999 29
1957 2 645 13 2,356 23
1956 1 440 5 1,916 19
745 666
First petitions filed in 1950-23, 1951-222, 1952-222, 1953-350, 1954-682,
1955-417, for a potential of 1,916 at the beginning of 1956.
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As contained in the above assumptions and chart, the theo-
retical Kansas City experience was sent to Mr. Claude Rice, the
Standing Trustee in Kansas City. He was asked to compile
figures which would support this chart or indicate its fallacy. Mr.
Rice's figures provided the basis for the following chart:
ACTUAL KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE
Potential Actual
Repeaters Repeaters
Petitions % In Were %
Year Filed Repeaters Repeaters Year of Potential
1965 1,245 67 5.38 12,826 .52%
1964 1,375 63 4.58 11,451 .55
1963 1,406 75 5.38 10,045 .75
1962 1,122 76 6.77 8,423 .90
1961 1,852 79 4.27 6,571 1.20
1960 1,257 78 6.21 5,319 1.47
1959 1,140 75 6.58 4,174 1.79
1958 1,175 81 6.89 2,999 2.70
1957 645 54 8.37 2,856 2.29
1956 440 42 9.55 1,916 2.19
690
Reexamination of the original data supplied by Mr. Rice
showed 690 repeaters over the ten year period instead of the 664
used in the first chart. The actual count indicated a higher per-
centage of repeaters in the earlier years and a lower percentage of
repeaters in the later years than had been expected. The column to
the far right in the actual experience chart indicates that in the
first few years the repeater percentage of the potential repeaters
increased each year. But beginning with the year 1959 the per-
centage decreased each year. It would seem that the early ex-
perience pointed to the accuracy of the mathematical probability
rule mentioned in a following paragraph of this article.
Mr. Rice feels that the probability would have carried through
if he had not changed his method of operation in 1958. He
stated:
Starting in 1958 1 adopted the practice of making available to
the debtor in every case a complete periodic report of his
account. This report to the debtor indicated each payment
which he made to the trustee (or which was taken from a
check sent in by his employer) the amount of cost which he
[Vol. 55,
CnzrTm xnm WAGE EARma PLANs
has been charged, the amount of cost which he will be
charged, and the amount of fee paid to his attorney ...
It is my conviction that this type of reporting to the debtor
enables him to learn the process of an intelligent planning
of his financial affairs to the end that when his plan is com-
pleted, he is aware of how his credit problems can be intel-
ligently budgeted. The result of this type of education seems
to have been more effective in rehabilitating debtors than any
other type of administration.95
Mr. Rice included a copy of the reports given to the debtor. They
show that the debtor will be made aware of the cost to him of
this method of settling obligations. Without reports of this kind,
the debtor would never realize the tremendous expense which has
actually been borne by him to satisfy the claims of his creditors.
After studying this table and visualizing a pool of wage earners
of a given size in a given area, one must conclude that the longer
Chapter XIII is used in an area, the greater proportion of the
potential pool will be repeaters. Conversely a decreasing propor-
tion of this pool will be first-time filers. Thus, after 10 years ex-
perience, it might be that more than 1%/ of the potential would be
expected repeaters. This result would seem to be borne out by
the only district which has had a substantially longer experience
than the 10 years studied in Kansas City.
As has been noted, the experience in Birmingham actually
started before the passage of Chapter XIII and may be considered
as having lasted some thirty years. For this reason the wage
earner pool, to a large extent, is composed of potential repeaters.
Statistics furnished by the administrative office of the United
States Courts show that from 1939 to 1965, inclusive, there have
been 114,812 Chapter XIII cases filed in the Northern District of
Alabama. By actual count it was found that the 1965 petitions
totaled 4,200 and included 2,750 repeaters or 2%o of the total
number of petitions filed in the past 26 years. Of course, while
114,812 petitions have been filed, this does not mean that there
is a pool of this many potential repeaters. Many of these were
repeat petitions. Assuming this number actually represents 60,000
people, we then have a figure indicating that 4 % of the true
potential filed repeat petitions in 1965. This is a logical result
95 Unpublished work of Mr. Claude L. Rice, Standing Trustee for the Federal
District Court, Kansas City, Kansas.
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when it is realized that the potential repeater pool is always grow-
ing and the potential first-time petition pool is always being re-
duced. By a reasonable rule of mathematical probability, it should
be expected that if 1% is the proper percentage to expect in the
first 10 years, this would double for the second 10 years, and
double again for the third 10 years to give us a possible proper
percentage of the potential repeaters of some 4 to 6%. This
prediction fits the situation as it has evolved in Birmingham. This
would remain a constant percentage since in thirty years the pool
will stop increasing because the earning span of the group is
ending.
An actual count of wage earner petitions filed in 1965 in
Birmingham is shown in the following chart:
Ist Petition 2ndl 3rd 4th 5thI 6th I7 th 9th 1 1th I0t 11th I 12th 114th I Totsl
1450 855 578 459 73 24 144 4 210 9 j7 3 2 4200
35%. 20.4, 14% 117.9% 537 .7 1.761 .09Z .0271 .018%. .GM7 .004. 1007.
Total repeat petitions in year, 2750 or 65.4%.96
The role of the attorney in these proceedings has not been
stressed. There must be a cooperative bar in order for Chapter
XIII petitions to be successful. Referees contend that the debtors'
lawyers in some sections have never heard of a Chapter XIII
petition and have no idea of its use. Referee Vance, in Birming-
ham, stated that lawyers from other states have asked him, "What
is this wage-earner plan that you use in your state?" Of course,
his answer is that if the lawyer has a copy of the Bankruptcy Act
he should look at the sections beginning with section 601 and
simply follow the Act.
Referee Rufus W. Reynolds, in Greensboro, North Carolina,
has solved this problem by having a printed legal size sheet en-
titled "Suggestions for Attorney for Debtor Filing Under Chapter
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act." This form is so clear, precise, and
96 The statistics for this Table were compiled by Miss Waverlyn Foust, an
employee in the referee's office in Birmingham. 4,200 petitions were compiled,
this being an estimated number filed in the last twelve months, Of the 4,200,
only 25 had ified a straight bankruptcy in the past. Of this 25, 2 were now
under their first wage earner's petition, 7 their second, 4 their third, 2 their
fourth, 4 their fifth, 3 their sixth, 2 their seventh, and 1 his eighth.
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helpful to the attorney that it is included in the appendix of
this article.9 7 It will be noted that there are nine steps following
the initial paragraph briefly explaning a wage-earner plan. Where
a form is to be filed in connection with the step, a copy of a
proposed form is also given the attorney. Referee Reynolds's in-
struction sheet has followed the procedure suggested in this article
that along with the petition there should be filed a plan, an ap-
plication for confirmation, and an order confirming the plan.
Moreover, since he gives the attorney a form for each of these, he
is thus in a position to confirm the plan at the first creditors'
meeting if there are no objections. He also provides the attorney
with a printed form with which he can file for his fee and
furnishes the attorney a copy of a circular letter to be sent to
creditors asking for approval of the plan in advance of the first
creditors' meeting. If a majority of the unsecured and secured
creditors approve the matter in advance, it may be disposed of at
the first meeting and sent to the standing trustee. The last thing
on this instruction sheet is a statement that for further information
as to the actual working of the wage-earner plan, the attorney
should contact the standing trustee. In states that do not have
specialized referees, the standing trustee undoubtedly finds that
he must act as somewhat of an advisor to attorneys and creditors
in order to relieve the referee of excess duties.
An examination of the casebooks used in the majority of law
schools indicates that law teachers and writers must accept a large
portion of the responsibility for the fact that the bar is not
knowledgeable in this area. Most of the casebooks devote a para-
graph to Chapter XIII, with little more than a brief statement
that it is an alternative to straight bankruptcy for the wage-earner
and gives the wage-earner an opportunity to pay his debts out of
future earnings. This is followed in one text by the statement that
it is not frequently used outside of Birmingham and the neigh-
boring districts. 98 The usual course in bankruptcy is a two hour,
non-required course, and the professor finds himself pushed for
classroom time to cover the straight bankruptcy sections. He is
quite apt to omit from his course the pages which even mention
97Exhibit I in the appendix to this article.
9 8 HANNA & MACLACHLAN, ClEDrroPS' RIGTS AND Co ronATE BRE-ORGANI-
zATxoN, 5th ed., 1957; MooRE, DEBTORS A.D CHmrroBs' PaGHrs, 282; NALER,
Crr Aim DxEBToR RELATIONS 692.
KENTucKY LAw JoumRAL
Chapter XIII. It is safe to say that if the professor had as one of
his questions on the bankruptcy or creditors' rights examination,
"State the purpose and briefly outline the procedure in a
Chapter XIII wage-earner petition," virtually all of the students
would say, "I don't know what you are talking about."
V. NEED FOR GREATER USE OF THE LAW
In 1963 Professor Max Siporin of the School of Social Work,
Tulane University, while a member of the faculty of the Uni-
versity of Kansas, made a study of 30 families who had filed
Chapter XIII petitions in Kansas City, Kansas. This work was
done by Professor Siporin in cooperation with two of his graduate
students, John P. Edwards and Lowell E. Jenkins, who submitted
the study to the graduate school of the University of Kansas in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree of Master of
Social Work. Professor Siporin then did a second study of 23
families who had filed a straight bankruptcy proceeeding in the
Federal District Court in New Orleans, Louisiana. 9 In Professor
Siporin's article in the Quarterly Report of the Conference on
Personal Finance Law, he published a table of characteristics of
these two groups as to age, religion, race, school completed, in-
come and official indebtedness. The two groups show very much
the same characteristics except for the last figure. In the wage-
earner petition group, the mean family official indebtedness was
$2029 as against $7680 in the bankruptcy families. Professor
Siporin stated that the interviewers gained the impression that
the bankrupt debtors who refused to cooperate seemed more
hostile and more ashamed than those who participated in the
bankruptcy study or those who participated in the wage earner
plan study. The impression of the interviewers was that "the
fact and stigma of bankruptcy is for many people still a very
shameful matter." In the thesis filed at the University of Kansas,
Mr. Edwards and Mr. Jenkins supply a number of tables showing
that the great majority of the Chapter XIII petitions were filed
by families which had the following characteristics: children under
13 years old, parents under 40 years old, more than two children,
husbands who are semiskilled or unskilled workers, and average
99 Siporin, A Study of Bankruptcy Court Debtors, 20 Q. REPORT 92 (1966).
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monthly income of under $400 per month. Very few of these
families were skilled or semi-professional workers.
These studies also rated the families as to adequate or in-
adequate level of family functioning. It was found that family
size often increased between the time of filing the wage-earner's
petition and the time of the study. The families who fell into the
very low average level, or poor level, of money management or
competency were families who either disagreed about the handling
of money or families in which the husband had control of the in-
come and made the decisions concerning its disposition. Most of
these husbands engaged in self-indulgent or compulsive spending
for alcohol, gambling, or purchasing non-essential merchandise. In
families showing good level of money management, the responsibi-
lity for spending was divided between the spouses. Major pur-
chases were discussed, and there was a minimum of impulsive
spending.
The study reported 76 types of problems which led to filing a
wage-earners' petition. These were broken down into marital
conflict and separation, 11; other family conflicts, 12; personal mal-
adjustment, 10; physical health, 13; vocational problems, 10; in-
come insufficiency, 10; and other problems, 10. The other pro-
blems included mechanical breakdown of auto, washing machine,
or other items.
Professor Siporin states in his article that 22 of the 28 wage-
earner's petition families and all 23 of the bankrupt families be-
came indebted to finance companies. In every case pressure from
the creditors became severe in the form of harassing phone calls,
garnishment of salaries, and lawsuits. These 30 families who for
one reason or another found themselves in a rather desperate
situation were then asked the source from which they learned of
Chapter XIII as a possible solution. In an unpublished study,
Professor Siporin divides the answers in the following fashion:
fellow worker, 7; employer, 7; creditor, 5; relative or friend, 5;
attorney, 4; self, 4; minister, 1; unknown, 1. It should be noted
that in the 30 cases more than one source of information was given
in 4 and in only 4 cases was the source of information an attorney.
In 4 cases, the petitioner indicated that he simply had general
knowledge of the existence of such a solution. It is quite signi-
ficant that in two-thirds of the situations knowledge of Chapter
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XIII was first gained from the place of employment or from the
creditor. 00
In one article a Referee in the Los Angeles area stated that the
stigma of bankruptcy was of little importance since our popula-
tion now is so mobile that the neighbors do not know whether
you have gone through bangruptcy and could care less. This idea
is also contained in the one-page treatment of Chapter XIII in
the most widely used creditor's rights casebook in this country. At
page thirty-four of Hanna and McLachlan, °10 there is the statement
that Chapter XIII is not frequently used "for the obvious reason
that those who feel the need of proceeding in a bankruptcy court
usually wish to be relieved of their debts without drawing upon
their subsequent earnings." On the same page is the statement
that "even though Chapter XIII has been described as enabling
the debtor to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy, it is probably
difficult for most debtors or their friends to understand why the
stigma, if any, is averted or eradicated by use of high chapter or
section numbers." Whichever of the two editors of this casebook
is responsible for that statement has obviously never gone through
bankruptcy.
From Professor Siporin's article it can be gathered that the
stigma is still a very real thing. If the author of the Reader's Digest
article, "We Went Bankrupt-On the Installment Plan,"' 02 is, as
she describes herself, a member of an average middle-class family,
it seems that the stigma is certainly a real thing in our country to-
day. This author had the feeling that her family was cheating its
creditors when it went into bankruptcy. She says that the "freeze
that prevails at church gatherings, P.T.A. meetings or just on the
100 1 wish to express my appreciation to Professor Siporin and to Mr. Claude
T. Rice, Standing Trustee, Federal District Court, Kansas City, Kansas, who
made available to me their various unpublished works, some of which had been
loaned to the Brookings Institution and in turn were loaned to me by the
Brookings Institution. See also Herrmann, Consul Factors in Consumer Bank-
ruptcy: A Case Study, Occasional Paper Series No. 6, INsTrruTE OF GovEmn-
mENTAL ArrJims, University of California. He found that "almost all the
debtors accumulated a heavy load of unsecured debts for expenses of the type
which should not be met out of current income. The amount of debt bears no
clear relation to income.:
10 1 HANNA & MACLACHLAN, CREmrroa MErS AN CORPOATE RE-oR(A -
ZATiON (5th ed. 1957).102 Reader's Digest, January, 1961, p. 31. See also Abbott, Bankruptcy-A
National Disgrace, 822 BANnmm 10 (1966), where a former Staff Judge Advocate
says, "It was during these days that I learned that straight bankruptcy is not the
answer because there is something terribly disgraceful about it."
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street comes not only from your creditors but from their friends
and relatives, and from your own friends, too. Your children are
no longer welcome in homes they have frequented for years. Try
explaining this to a ten year old!" Yet, if we are to believe the
author of another Reader's Digest article, "Ready Help for People
in Debt,"'01 3 the wage-earner petition family described therein
felt that it had paid its debts in an honorable fashion. If neighbors
learn about the wage-earner plan at all, they should not hold the
Chapter XIII petitioner in contempt.
In The Waste Makers, Vance Packard makes this statement:
"The average American family is about three months from bank-
ruptcy."'0 4 This general debt-ridden condition of the average
family is borne out by statistics indicating that in the last twenty
years consumer credit increased from about five billion to over
seventy-five billion, or fifteen times the original figure. The
national income has a little more than doubled. 10 5 Convincing
evidence of the need of a guardianship for the over-extend-
ed creditor and a sanctuary for the "credit drunk" may further
be found in Hillel Black's book, Buy Now, Pay Later. In this
excellent report of our consumer credit situation Mr. Black de-
scribes the high pressure salesmanship of the "debt merchants".
It is undoubtedly true that various types of "loan shark" legisla-
tion over the country has kept down the cost of borrowing money.
In most instances, however, this does not keep down the over-
extension of credit 0 6
Various methods intended to regulate the granting of credit
have failed. Even efforts to forbid welfare families from buying
on time have been found merely to give the creditor a new meth-
od of harassment.17 David Caplovitz, in his book, The Poor Pay
More, which is actually a report of the Bureau of Applied Social
Research at Columbia University, states that although ninety per
103 Reader's Digest, June 1961, . 68. This article led to the filing of the
first Chapter XIi petition in the Southern District of Ohio in 1961. This led to
thirty-four others in 1961, 263 in 1963 1,042 in 1964, and 1,002 in 1965. The
Northern District of Ohio has never had over 862. See also Schumacher, A Wage
Earners' Plan that Works, 19 Q. REPORT 64 (1965).
10 4 PACKARD, THE WAsrE MAXrms, 154 (1960).
10 5 Chart D in the appendix to this article.
10 6 Mr. Black states that in New Jersey a customer cannot borrow more than
$500 from a small loan company at one time, and this keeps the illegal loan shark
in business. BLAbx, Buy Now, PAY LATE3, 125 (1961).
107 See CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY Momn, 50 (1963).
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cent of a-person's wages are free from garnishment in New York,
there is little protection for the over-extended debtor. It would
seem that this fact merely spurs the "debt merchant" to use in-
genuity in arriving at other types of harassment. Nor did the pro-
tection of eighty-five percent of the wage-earner's wages in Illinois
protect William Rodriquez from harassment which led to his
suicide.1 08
A number of the national associations of credit men are making
efforts to educate the public in the intelligent use of credit. These
groups have been able to persuade some schools to give courses
based on materials they have compiled. 09 An example of the
interest being taken in the serious consumer credit situation is
the study being carried on by the Family Service Association of
America. This is supported by contributions from labor unions,
bankers, credit bureaus, and small loan companies, as well as by
the large stores widely using the 18% interest revolving credit
plans.' 0 This project was organized by the general credit manager
of the J. C. Penney Company. The working committee includes
legal aid officials, officials of the Family Service Association of
America, directors of various national consumer finance associa-
tions, the American Bar Association, various officials of labor
unions, and specialists in this field associated with banks and
banker associations.
These efforts at education of the public and at self-regulation
will undoubtedly aid in stabilizing our consumer credit situation.
The experience of various efforts of this kind have shown, how-
ever, that when the more conscientious and ethical "debt mer-
chants" curb their activities they automatically open up a large
field for the less ethical "loan shark" type of "debt merchant" as
both a lender and merchandizer. The educational approach to
this overall problem is certainly sound, but it is a slow process
which will fail to reach the large segment of our population most
in need of protection from such practices. In states where a wage
earner's earnings are exempt from garnishment, the wage-earner
108 See BLAcK, Buy Now, PAY LATm, 125, (1961).
109 See Statement of William J. Cheyney, National Foundation for Consumer
Credit, before the "Douglass Committee," Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 45b.
11o Roberts, Nation Wide Study of Community Credit Counseling Services
Being Conducted by Family Service Association, 20 Q. REPoar 86 (1966).
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is still not free from the threats of wholesale repossession of every-
thing he has; in these states a merchandizer or a lender almost
always takes a chattel mortgage over the buyer or borrower's total
wordly possessions.
Chapter XIII does not give complete protection to the wage-
earner who has mortgaged all of his personal property since the
secured creditors must adopt the plan unanimously. Nevertheless,
in order to vote as a secured creditor, evidence must be introduced
by the secured creditor that there is not usury hidden in the debt.
In a recent case at the lower court level, a referee in Birmingham
held that an eighteen percent revolving account of a national
merchandizer was usurious.
In addition to the study being made by the Family Service
Association of America, a $500,000 grant from the Ford Founda-
tion has been made to finance a five-year study of consumer debt
behavior by the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan's Institute for Social Research. An overall study of
bankruptcy financed by a $314,000 grant from the Ford Founda-
tion is being carried on by the Brookings Institution. In his
description of the study, the director stated, "We are giving con-
siderable attention, for example, to how Chapter XIII is being
used and why it is not used.""'
VI. THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE LAW
Installment buying was introduced to this country by Issac
Merritt Singer in order to sell the early Singer Sewing Machine." 2
While the installment selling device was not new in the 1930's its
broad use has grown and developed since the "Hoover Depres-
sion." Outstanding installment credit has risen from approxi-
mately 2.5 billion dollars in 1945 to approximtaely 63 billion dol-
lars in 1966, while non-installment credit has risen from approxi-
mately 3 billion dollars to 17 billion dollars."3 The increase in
consumer debt and installment selling began in the early 1940's
and by 1946 had attracted considerable attention." 4 These statis-
"'l Stanley, Brookings Institution s Study of Bankruptcy, 20 Q. REPoRT 91(1966). A description of the Michigan study at page 87 of the same issue.
12 Trm Wrc, Buy Now, PAY LATER, 109.
"13 TnsE WonLw ALmAxAc, 761 (1966).
"14 THE WonRL ALMANAC, 390 (1947).
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tics indicate the change in the consumer credit situation since the
time of the first study which led to the passage of Chapter XIII in
1939.115
Our entire consumer credit approach has undergone a com-
plete change in the last thirty years. Creditor interests now rely
more on future earnings as an asset to repay debts and would like
to include future earnings as an asset in straight bankruptcy. In
the alternative, it is not surprising that the creditor groups would
be in favor of requiring the bankrupt wage earner to use Chapter
XIII and deny him the use of straight bankruptcy. Two bills are
now pending in Congress which would virtually require a wage
earner to go into a Chapter XIII proceeding and pay his creditors
in full if it is feasible for him to do so.116 These bills now pending
have generally been opposed and criticized by the legal aid groups,
but they are supported by the American Bar Association. The
over-all purpose of these bills is to introduce into Chapter XIII
an involuntary petition and to require that the feasibility of an
extension under Chapter XIII be considered before a discharge is
granted in a voluntary straight bankruptcy petition. 1 7 This, of
course, would put the wage earner in a position unique in the
history of bankruptcy, unless we view his earning power as an
asset, an attitude which leads us back to the basic idea of debtor's
prisons.
115 The Hastings-Michener bills of 1932 seem to be the first federal effort
to study the possibility of legislation which would enable the debtor to avoid the
stigma of bankruptcy. See HANNA & MAcLAcHLAN, CRDrroA's RiGHrs CASFS
Asm MATERIALs 34 (5th ed. 1957).116 S. REP. No. 613, H.R. 292, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See also H.R.
127, H.R. 84, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). For an excellent discussion of the
bills now pending and the groups sponsoring and opposing them, see Adam,
Should Chapter XIII Bankruptcy be Involuntary, 44 TExAs L. REv. 533, 541(1966). See Twinen, American Bar Association Approaches Proposed Amendment
to Bankruptcy Act, 19 Q. REPoRT 109 (1965).1171 wish to express my appreciation to Referees Herbert B. Maulitz and
William R. Vance of Birmingham for the co-operation given me in this study and
to the many federal court clerks, standing trustees, and referees across the
country who have taken time from their busy day to answer my questions.
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CHART E
RANK BY RATIO OF
1. Ala. 32
2. Nev. 383
3. Tenn. 414
4. Ga. 515
5. Colo. 547
6. Ariz. 548
7. Ore. 574
8. Calif. 614
9. Ohio 653
10. Maine 654
11. Wash. 788
12, Ill. 788
13. Kan. 817
14. Ky. 821
15. Utah 822
16. Wyo. 901
17. Ind. 909
18. Okla. 921
19. Idaho 924
20. N.H. 935
21. Va. 979
22. Mo. 1,020
23. N. Mex. 1,027
24. Vt. 1,177
25. Mimi. 1,329
26. Mich* 1,331
EMPLOYM BANKRUPTCY TO POPUIATION
27. Mont.
28. Wis.
29. La.
30. W.Va.
31. Neb.
32. Iowa
33. R.Z.
34. Hawaii
35. Miss.
36. Conn.
37. Alaska
38. Ark.
39. N.Y.
40. N.D;
41. S.D,
42. MAsS.
43. N.J*
44. Fla.
45. Del.
46. Tex,
47. D.C.
48. S.C.
49. Md.
50. Penn.
51. N.C.
1,344
1,352
1,379
1,461
1,847
2,008
2,380
2,-501
2.,627
2,688
2,975
3,357
3,521
3,677
4,725
5,735
8,895
9,766
9,917
11,310
12,509
17,018
19,022
22,108
36,743
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CHART F
RAK BY RATIO OF CHAPTER XIII PETITIONS TO STATE POPUIATIONS*
1. Ala. .418 27. Ore. 25,266
2. Tenn. 875 28. S.C. 25,399
3. Maine 1,213 29. W.Va. 28,188
4. Ga. 1,310 30. Neb. 28,226
5. Kan. 1,749 31. Okla. 31,043
6. Ky. 3,532 32. Nev. 31,697
7. Colo. 3,995 33. Ind. 33,214
8. N.Mex. 4,081 34. Md. 33,563
9. Calif. 4,257 35. N.Y. 41,639
10. Ark. 5,132 36. Penn. 43,280
11. Wash. 5,834 37. N.C. 53,119
12. Va. 5,911 38. Miss. 62,232
13. Minn. 6,218 39. N.J. 62,544
14. Idaho 6,671 40. La. 63,863
15. Ohio 7,121 41. Wyo. 65,033
16. Ariz. 7,797 42. Mont. 67,476
17. Wis. 9,733 43. Fla. 73,903
18. Hawaii 11,718 44. Tex. 78,983
19. Alaska 13,083 45. Conn. 81,692
20. S.D. 13,419 46. D.C. 81,979
21. Iowa 13,856 47. Mass. 87,142
22. Ill. 19,461 48. Vt. 389,881
23. Utah 19,791 49. N.H. 606,921
24. Mo. 22,856 50. N.D. 632,446
25. Del. 23,146 51. R.I. none filed
26. Mich. 23,778
* Example: 1 filed for every 418 people in the state of Alabama.
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CHART G
PER CAPITA INCOME
Source: World Almanac 1966, p. 753
1. Miss. $1,438 27. Iowa $2,376
2, S.C. 1,655 28. N.H. 2,377
3. Ark. 1,655 29. Wyo. 2,441
4. Ala. 1,749 30. Wis. 2,490
5. Ky. 1,830 31. -R.I. 2,514
6. Tenn. 1,859 32. Ind. 2,544
7. La. 1,877 33. Colo. 2,566
8. S.D. 1,879 34. o. 2,600
9. N.D. 1,913 35. Penn. 2,601
10. N.C. 1,913 36. Dre. 2,606
11. (a. 1,943 37. HaVii 2,622
12. W.Va. 1,965 38. Wash. 2,635
13. Idaho 2,020 39. Ohio 2,646
14. N.Mex. 2,041 40. Mich. 2,755
15. Okla. 2,083 41. Md. 2,867
16. Vt. 2,119 42. Mass. 2,965
17. Maine 2,132 43. N.J. 3,005
18. Utah 2,156 44. Ill. 3,041
19. Tex. 2,188 45. Cal. 3,103
20. Ariz. 2,233 46. Alaska 3,116
21. Va. 2,239 47. N.Y. 3,162
22. Fla. 2,251 48. Nev. 3,Z48
23. Mont. 2,252 49. Conn. 3,281
24. Kan. 2,346 50. Del. 3,460
25. --Neb. 2,349 51. D.C. 3,544
26. Minn. 2,375
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STATEMENT OF AFFAIRS
(EACH BLANK ON THIS STATEMENT MUST BE FILLED IN, EVE.1 NEGATIVE
ANSWERS. OIL THE PETITION WILt, NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE CLERK)
Deor. N..e DcbDw. lOs 450eAdd=
MNaced?- Wife's or Hushans Nad'es
Separated or Divorced? Do you pay or receive alimony or child support?
How much per month? Other dependento (list by name and relationship)-
Name and Address of Employer:
Type of Work You Do*.,,
Plant &I 3adge or Card Number
Previous Employment .
No. years so employ 1,
Soc. Se. No_
Gross Wages or Salary: I per
Net Wages or Salary: $ per -
(After dedutions for income taxes, social security, insurance
and union dues only)
Spostes Earnings: .
Other Income'
Own or Buying Automobiles__
Mdakes and Modet?_,
Monthlypaymen? ,
To Whom?
Amount of debts secured by auto S
Is I-our employer deducting for any Credit Unir.
Store Account4 or Other Debt?_
if so, give principal balance and aceount -of payramt
On .or Buylng Ho
Monthly Paymen?
Cost of Hom S
Equity
Rea c per month.
Have you ever filed bankrupty When was List time
Have.)ou ever filed Debtors Court CaM? When was last time?
Do you owe any debts not listed on Schedule "A" of your petition
If o, state name Of each ereditor, amount due, and rqason said creditor is not scheduled:
Signed and Sworn to on 19-. (Date)
DEBTOR
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JLT-33
WAGE ARNER PLAN
SUGGESTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR
FILING UNDER CHAPTER XIII OF BANKRUPTCY ACT
Rufus W. Reynolds, Referee in Bankruptcy
What is comonly referred to as a "Wage Earner Plan" can be either an extension (post-
ponement) or a composition (compromise) or a combinstion of both, of a wage earner's debts
under the supervision of the Bankruptcy Court. The basic requirements are that the Plan
should not exceed 36 months in duration from its inception and that the wage earner cannot
incur additional debts during the period of the existence of the Plan in excess of those
authorized by the Court. The debtor is not a bankrupt; however, the payment and satisfac-
tion of his debts represented in his Petition will be under the supervision of the Bankruptcy
Court under a duly appointed trustee.
In order to initiate and carry out a petition the following are necessary:
(1) Petition. Petition should be filed with the Clerk of the U. S. District Court
with the original and two signed copies and a $15.00 filing fee ($30.00 if man and wife
file). Attached Is an acceptable. simplified copy of a petition. These forms may be used
by completing the sane or a comercial set of bankruptcy petitions may be purchased.
(2) Circular Letter and Proposed Plan. After the petition is filed a circular letter
should be sent to each of the creditors listed in the petition explaining the proceeding and
enclosing with the letter a copy of a claim to be executed and returned to the attorney for
the debtor or the Referee in Bankruptcy. A copy of the proposed Plan should be enclosed.
Suggested forms for circular letter, modified claim and plan are attached.
(3) Certificate of Service. After the nailing of the above instruments to the creditors,
the attorney for the debtor should execute the attached certificate of service and file it
with the Referee.
(4) Official Notice of First Creditors' Heeting. The Referee in Bankruptcy notifies
the creditors of the first meeting at which time additional claims are received and the Plan
voted upon. If a majority in number and amount vote in favor of the Plan, it is "approved."
The proposed Plan is submitted to the Referee at the first creditors' meeting before the
voting. If approved, a Trustee is designated to receive the funds.
(5) Application For Confirmation and Order Confirming Plan. The application for Con-
firmation of Plan. together with the Order confirming the plan, one copy of each, should be
ready and available at the First Creditors'eeting. A form for each of the above is hereto
attached for your convenience.
(6) Payments and Distributions. It is highly desirable that the debtor start making
his weekly or monthly payments to his attorney as soon as he files his petition. These funds
to be later turned over by the attorney to the Trustee. These moneys are referred to as
"initial payments." After the confirmation of the plan, the debtor shall make payment to the
Trustee on a monthly or weekly basis or as the Court may direct and may be deducted from the
wage earner's salary and sent direct to the Trustee. The Trustee shall then disburse in
accordance with the Plan and order as confirmed the money at intervals as directed to the
creditors.
(7) Cowposition and/or Extension. If a coxhination extension and composition is called
for In the Plan, once the debtor pays the monthly or weekly payments called for the total
number of months requested, or sooner, the debts are then discharged in accordance with the
accepted Plan and the proceeding terminated.
(8) Attorney's Fee. Attorney's fee should cc-'e from the funds paid in by the debtor to
the Trustee. The average fee is $50.00 fron the first moneys paid in plus five percent of the
balance of the moneys paid in to the Trustee not to exceed a total of $200.00. The percentage*
is paid and disbursed along as other creditors are paid. Attached is a petition for attorney's
fee. Only the original is required to be filed with the Referee.
(9) Copy of Documents, Any documents which require more than'an original may be repro-
duced by any accepted office duplicating method.
Additional sets of these forms enclosed and attached hereto may be obtained without charge
by contacting Rufus W. Reynolds, Referee, Southeastern Building, Greensboro, North Carolina, or
Jordan J. Frassineti, Standing Trustee for Wage Earner Plan, Southeastern Building, Greensboro,
North Carolina.
(For further information as to the actual workings of the Wage Earner Plan, contact Jordan J.
Frassineti, the Standing Trustee for the Wage Earner Plan.)
